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This paper provides an introduction to, 
and critical analysis of, the key change 
to scheme: the shift from historical 
grandparenting of free units to an 
uncapped production-based allocation. 
Decisions around long-term allocation 
will drive major investments and steer 
New Zealand’s emissions track over the 
coming decades.
Background: the New Zealand emissions 
trading scheme
New Zealand’s ETS, first passed into law 
in late 2008, is unique internationally in 
that all sectors of the economy are to be 
phased in by 2015: electricity generation, 
energy, industrial processes, transport 
fuels, agriculture and forestry. 
Under the ETS, entities that are 
responsible for greenhouse gas emissions 
(such as fuel importers, cement 
manufacturers, dairy processors, or those 
clearing forests) are required to submit 
one New Zealand unit (NZU) to the 
government for each tonne of emissions. 
Those undertaking compliant forestry 
activity are entitled to receive units. 
Some emissions-intensive sectors, such 
as industry and agriculture, will receive free 
allocations of units, ostensibly to protect 
their international competitiveness. Other 
sectors, such as electricity generation and 
liquid fuels, will be required to purchase 
(domestically or internationally) units 
to surrender to the government. As 
international Kyoto-compliant units are 
acceptable under the scheme, the price of 
NZUs will be capped at the international 
price of emissions.
Carbon leakage and free allocation
There is substantial economic analysis 
showing that once there is widespread 
international emissions pricing, the 
least-cost domestic response is economy-
wide pricing with no exemptions or free 
allocation (for example, see Montgomery, 
1972; Stavins, 2007; NZIER/Infometrics, 
2009). However, there is a common concern 
that without widespread international 
action, emissions pricing could cause 
emitters to lose competitiveness or even 
relocate to jurisdictions that don’t price 
emissions, leading to both job losses and 
higher global emissions. This effect is 
known as carbon leakage. 
This concern is often overstated, 
both environmentally and economically. 
Although the competitiveness of some 
sectors will certainly be affected by 
emissions pricing, analysis shows that 
this does not generally lead to major 
economy-wide issues or major increases 
in emissions (IEA, 2008; WRI, 2008).
Nonetheless, free allocation of units 
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forms part of every emissions trading 
scheme currently being developed. It aims 
to support the competitiveness of affected 
sectors until the world transitions to more 
widespread emissions pricing, or at least 
to uniform action across sectors. It can 
be thought of either as compensation for 
assets stranded by the policy change, or 
else as a production subsidy to be phased 
out as competitors introduce emissions 
pricing.1
New Zealand’s 2008 ETS used a 
‘grandparenting’ approach to allocation: 
that is, the free allocation was to be a fixed 
number of units based on historic levels 
of emissions. Energy-intensive trade-
exposed industries and the agriculture 
sector were to receive a fixed annual 
allocation of units until 2018, set at 90% 
of 2005 emissions, phasing out to zero by 
2030.
Under grandparenting, new invest-
ments or expanded production do not 
receive any allocation. This could lead 
to lost investment in the short term, but 
avoids locking in high emissions activity 
that could be uneconomic in the future. 
It also ensures that the allocation of new 
capital investment across different sectors 
of the economy is efficient for the new 
environment in which emissions are 
priced, thus promoting a lower carbon 
economy as a whole. 
The 2009 ETS amendments change 
the free allocation from grandparenting to 
a production-based (also called intensity-
based) approach, in which units are 
awarded per unit of current production. 
Under production-based allocation, new 
investments and increased production receive 
the same level of support as existing activity, 
so are encouraged. There is, however, a risk 
of locking in uneconomic high emissions 
activities, leading to inefficient allocation 
of capital between various sectors of the 
economy. Even though firms are awarded 
units for free, they still have an incentive to 
improve emissions intensity at the margin, 
because any efficiency improvements free 
up permits that can be sold at the full market 
price.
Cost of free allocation to the wider economy 
Intuitively and according to economic 
theory, providing protection to some 
sectors means the rest of the economy will 
face greater costs. As the specialist adviser 
to the parliamentary select committee, Dr 
Suzi Kerr, put it:
Not having effective reduction policies 
in every sector would raise the costs 
of compliance to the economy as a 
whole. Excluding a sector from the 
emissions trading system or providing 
high levels of free allocation to some 
firms imposes high costs on all other 
sectors and firms who must cover the 
costs of those emissions through taxes. 
(Kerr, 2009)
Results of New Zealand general 
equilibrium modelling (NZIER/Infomet-
rics, 2009) suggest there is no impact 
or even a small benefit to the economy 
as a whole from free allocations. This 
result hinges on the assumption that 
few mitigation opportunities exist in 
the protected sectors, so introducing an 
emissions price simply leads to output 
being curtailed, with flow-on negative 
consequences in the wider economy. Other 
economic analyses argue that significant 
abatement opportunities do in fact exist 
(Bertram and Terry, 2008), in which case 
free allocation would clearly be welfare-
diminishing.
Even if we assume that free allocation 
comes at no overall cost to the economy, 
there can still be significant effects. Again 
to quote Kerr (2009):
Free allocation redistributes the cost of 
climate policy away from the owners 
of protected firms, who tend to have 
higher than average incomes, toward 
all taxpayers. It also significantly raises 
the overall cost of the climate policy to 
the economy. A policy that is fiscally 
neutral can still have large damaging 
effects on the parts of the economy 
and society that do not receive free 
allocation.
International experience
Unlike the economy-wide coverage of 
the New Zealand ETS, overseas schemes 
tend to cover only the energy, industy and 
sometimes transport sectors.
Empirical analysis of a proposed ETS 
for the United States shows that a free 
allocation in perpetuity of 13–21% of the 
total number of units issued would fully 
compensate private industry for equity 
losses, or equivalently a 50% allocation 
phasing out to zero by 2025 (Bovenberg et 
al., 2003; Stavins, 2007).2
Legislation currently being considered 
by the United States Senate proposes a 
similar split: roughly 17% of the total 
value of allocation to 2050 will accrue to 
private industry (Stavins, 2009a). Trade-
exposed emissions-intensive industries 
receive an initial allocation of 15% of total 
units, decreasing over time in line with 
the overall cap, and phasing out to zero 
after 2025. Within this cap, allocation is 
production-based (Stavins, 2009b).
Under the European Union’s ETS, 
trade-exposed industries (around 25% 
of emissions in the scheme) receive free 
allocation for 100% of their emissions if 
they are using best practice technology. 
There is a capped pool for allocation to 
these industries which declines with the 
overall reduction target (European Union, 
2009).
The proposed Australian carbon 
pollution reduction scheme (CPRS) 
initially provides 94.5% free allocation 
to highly trade-exposed energy-intensity 
sectors and 66% to moderately exposed 
sectors. Both phase out at 1.3% per 
annum for the first ten years, with the 
phase-out rate reset five-yearly thereafter 
(Wong, 2009).3 Free allocation is initially 
around 20% of total units, but this pool is 
uncapped and expected to rise as industrial 
At an emissions price of $100/+CO2, free allocation 
of 30 to 40 million units per annum is an annual cost 
to government of $3-4 billion.
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production growth outstrips the 1.3% 
phase-out rate (Australian Government, 
2008). 
Economic modelling of the Australian 
proposals shows that production in some 
sectors, particularly aluminium, would 
be affected, suggesting that some free 
allocation may be warranted. However, 
there does not appear to have been any 
analysis on the optimal level of this support 
from the perspective of the economy as 
a whole. Interestingly, carbon leakage 
is not observed in the modelling until 
emissions prices of well over AU$200/
tCO2. (Australian Treasury, 2008)
Free allocation in the New Zealand ETS 
The amended New Zealand ETS is closely 
aligned to the proposed Australian CRPS, 
and uses production-based free allocation. 
Agriculture and high emissions-intensity 
sectors are to receive a 90% free allocation 
per unit of production; moderate intensity 
sectors a 60% free allocation. Both are 
phased out at 1.3% per annum, with this 
rate fixed in legislation.
Figure 1 shows the free allocation 
of units to industry and agriculture 
expected under the previous and current 
legislation,4 compared to two target 
levels for New Zealand emissions: a 50% 
reduction on 1990 levels by 2050 (the 
government’s current target), and an 
80% reduction. Note that while the 50% 
and 80% curves give an indication of the 
number of NZUs that might be issued, they 
do not actually represent a cap on New 
Zealand’s total domestic emissions: under 
the New Zealand ETS, emissions can be 
arbitrarily high as long as additional units 
are purchased offshore to cover  them.5
Note that these curves ignore units 
generated by (and used to cover) the 
growth and harvest of post-1990 plantation 
forests. Forestry has been excluded because 
it is cyclical: at some times it generates 
significant units, in others these need to 
be repaid as forests are harvested. Over the 
long term it is assumed to net out to zero.
The projections represented by the 
dashed and black lines were released by the 
minister for climate change issues, Nick 
Smith (Smith, 2009a), and minister of 
finance, Bill English, respectively.6 Neither 
of these data sets was made available to 
the public at the time when the legislation 
was open for public submissions, and the 
second was only recently released under 
the Official Information Act. 
Several important points can be noted 
in relation to Figure 1:
• The total allocation is very high 
compared to overseas schemes. Under 
the 2009 legislation, most NZUs will 
be allocated for free to cover emissions 
in industry and agriculture. 
• Until around 2020, both the 2008 and 
2009 schemes provide comparable, 
very high, levels of free allocation. 
Beyond 2020, the 2009 allocation 
phases out much more slowly. 
• The free allocation under the 2009 
legislation declines by less than 1% per 
annum. Although allocation per unit 
of production phases out at 1.3% per 
annum, production levels increase 
with time, partially offsetting this.
• Under production-based allocation, 
the small changes in assumptions 
between the dashed and solid curves 
have significant impacts on allocations 
(and hence fiscal implications).7 
• If the 1.3% phase-out rate continues, 
the scheme may not be compatible 
with the government’s 50% emissions 
reduction target, depending on how 
quickly production grows in the 
subsidised sectors. 
• If New Zealand takes on a more 
ambitions target closer to 80% 
reductions by 2050, the 1.3% phase-
out rate is far too gradual.
The very high level of free allocation in 
the New Zealand ETS means that unlike 
in overseas schemes, there is no specific 
allocation of units for transition in the 
residential or small business sectors, or to 
fund emissions reductions programmes. 
This is partly because New Zealand’s gross 
emissions are now much higher than the 
1990 baseline, so the entire pool of units 
is taken up covering just the agriculture 
and industry sectors. The free allocation 
also comes at a considerable fiscal cost: 
at an emissions price of $100/tCO2, free 
allocation of 30 to 40 million units per 
annum is an annual cost to the government 
of $3–4 billion.
Criticism has been levelled at the 
assumption underlying the solid and 
black curves, namely that the 1.3% phase-
out rate will remain unchanged when 
the legislation will be reviewed every five 
years.8 There are two major reasons why 
this assumption is appropriate. First, 
the 1.3% rate is set in legislation and will 
remain fixed unless a future government 
amends the law. The analysis presented 
in Figure 1 is therefore of the law as it 
currently stands. 
Second, the government’s communi-
cations relating to the 2009 amendments 
assume that the rate will remain unchanged, 
including graphs (presumably based on 
the black curve of Figure 1) to illustrate 
how a 1.3% phase-out rate is consistent 
with a 50% by 2050 target (see appendix of 
Hood (2009)). The government’s message 
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Figure 1: Long-term free allocation of units to agriculture and industry under the 2008 ETS 
(blue line) and two government estimates for the 2009 ETS dashed and solid, and 
possible emissions reduction targets for New Zealand of 50% and 80% reduction 
on 1990 levels by 2050 (grey areas)
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has been that, all things being equal, there 
is no reason that the rate need change. 
Of course, Figure 1 only shows the 
level of free allocation to industry and 
agriculture, not actual emissions levels. 
Emissions are expected to continue rising, 
and by 2030 New Zealand’s total gross 
emissions in the dashed-line data set of 
Figure 1 reach 80 million tonnes. With 
rising emissions, New Zealand will need to 
meet its targets largely through purchasing 
units internationally. As the international 
price of emissions units escalates, this will 
become an increasingly expensive strategy. 
At some point there will need to be a clear 
signal to investors of the need to transition 
to a low-carbon economy. 
At present there is no long-term 
stable carbon price path on which to base 
investment decisions. It therefore falls 
on governments to signal the expected 
policy settings well into the future. The 
current signals – that substantial free 
allocation should still be in place in 2050 
– run the risk of locking in inappropriate 
investment, especially where investment 
decisions are made around long-lived 
assets in the short term. 
The value of free allocation
Under the 2008 legislation, free allocation 
would have phased out quickly, leaving 
the government with surplus units after 
2020. These could have been sold to fund 
tax changes, debt reduction or climate 
programmes. With the 2009 amendments, 
the government has instead chosen to 
allocate virtually all NZUs for free to 
industry and agriculture.
The forgone revenue to the government 
resulting from the change has been 
estimated by the Treasury to be $110 billion 
to 2050, assuming a modest emissions price 
of NZ$50 per tonne (Treasury, 2009). With 
a more plausible (IPCC, 2007; OECD, 2009; 
Australian Treasury, 2008) emissions price 
rising to NZ$100 by 2050, the cost to the 
government approaches $200 billion. 
Economic theory suggests that using 
any surplus units to reduce debt or 
general taxation, rather than maintaining 
subsidies, would have the greatest benefit 
economy-wide. However, there would 
also have been the opportunity to fund 
transitional assistance for households and 
small businesses, support clean technology, 
and undertake emissions reductions such 
as energy efficiency. The proposed United 
States legislation takes this approach, 
with 80% of the scheme’s proceeds being 
directed to householders over the life of 
the scheme, both directly and through 
programmes (Stavins, 2009a). 
Unfortunately, the government has 
not undertaken (or at least released) any 
economic analysis of the optimal means 
of allocating units in the New Zealand 
scheme, so it is unclear why the decision 
was made to allocate all units to agriculture 
and industry.
Breakdown of allocation – agriculture and 
industry
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of units 
allocated to the agriculture and industry 
sectors.
 Industry
There are two obvious changes brought in 
by the 2009 amendments. First, the initial 
allocation has decreased by around one 
third. Because eligibility rules have been 
changed to match the draft Australian 
legislation, fewer New Zealand firms are 
expected to qualify.
Second, allocation remains more or less 
constant, because production increases at 
roughly 1.3% per annum, matching the 
1.3% phase-out in support. These data sets 
clearly do not provide for any significant 
new entrant activity, such as expanded 
methanol and cement production, a coal-
to-urea plant or a coal-to-liquid fuels 
plant (plans for all of which are being 
actively developed). These would see the 
allocation rising significantly.
The initial level of assistance appears 
similar to that proposed in other markets. 
To see this, consider a hypothetical New 
Zealand ETS that includes only the 
transport (25MT emissions) and energy 
(22MT emissions) sectors. In this market, 
10MT of free allocation is around 20% 
of total units. But the New Zealand 
timeframe for assistance is clearly longer, 
and likely to be overcompensating firms, 
based on US experience (Stavins, 2007).
The allocative baseline (number of 
units awarded per unit of production) is 
to be set at historic New Zealand sectoral 
average emissions. Firms producing 
with better than average efficiency will 
receive more units than they require, and 
vice versa for low-efficiency producers. 
Particularly in sectors where only a single 
plant operates, this choice of baseline 
sends a message that business as usual is 
all that is expected.
However, the New Zealand legislation 
also allows Australian baselines to be 
imported directly into the New Zealand 
scheme. For example, New Zealand sectors 
can be deemed eligible for assistance 
because their Australian counterparts 
are, even if they would not have been 
otherwise. In this case the New Zealand 
ETS must use the Australian baseline. This 
raises the potential of further significant 
windfalls or costs to firms, and uncertain 
costs to the taxpayer.
The effect of the change in allocation 
methodology coupled with a generous 
Figure 2: Long-term free allocation of units to the agriculture and industry sectors under the 
2008 (blue lines) and 2009 (black dashed and solid lines) ETS
Free Units Allocated to Industry and Agriculture
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Year
M
ill
io
n 
U
ni
ts
Agriculture
Industry
0
10
20
30
40
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Year
Free Units Allocated to Industry and Agriculture
Agriculture 2009
Agriculture 2008
Industry 2008
Industry 2009
M
ill
io
n 
U
ni
ts
Page 34 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 2 – February 2010
choice of baseline is illustrated in the 
example below, that the government has 
put forward to illustrate their preference 
for production-based allocation: Holcim’s 
pending decision on a new cement plant. 
Holcim has said it would not have 
invested in the new plant under the 2008 
legislation. Under the 2009 legislation 
there is clearly a strong incentive to 
upgrade: note that the company’s costs 
decrease substantially even though its 
emissions rise. 
However, the incremental cost to the 
taxpayer of supporting the new plant 
is substantial: $14 million per annum. 
It employs roughly the same number 
of people, so there are not significant 
employment benefits. Global emissions 
are reduced by 137,000 tonnes, but at $50/
tCO2 this should only cost $6.85 million. 
Also consider the $18 million per 
annum of free allocation to the existing 
plant. If the plant’s production was 
replaced by imports, global emissions 
would decrease, not increase. The plant 
supports around 130 direct jobs, so $18 
million is around $140,000 per job per 
year. 
It may be the case that these high levels 
of subsidy are necessary and desirable 
based on the plant’s contributions to the 
wider economy, but this would need to be 
demonstrated through careful analysis. 
Obviously, these costs are highly 
dependent on the emissions price 
assumed, so the intention is not to draw 
concrete conclusions. Rather, this example 
is intended to illustrate that detailed cost-
benefit analysis of individual allocation 
decisions could be very important where 
large wealth transfers are involved.
Agriculture
Returning to Figure 2, it is clear that 
the majority of free allocation is to the 
agriculture sector.
No overseas jurisdictions currently 
plan to price agricultural emissions. 
However, there is a bipartisan political 
consensus in New Zealand that matching 
this 100% level of cover would be 
unaffordable here. This is because New 
Zealand’s emissions profile is unique for a 
developed country: agricultural emissions 
make up nearly half of total emissions, so 
to exclude them completely would place 
a significant additional burden on other 
sectors of the economy.
Although agriculture is not given 100% 
cover, Figure 2 shows that the current 
legislation provides a very high level of 
ongoing free allocation. The benefits 
and costs of this support to the economy 
as a whole, rather than simply to the 
agriculture sector, should be considered. 
An allocation of 30 million units per 
annum (an opportunity cost of $3 billion 
per annum at an emissions price of $100 
per tonne) may be a poor investment 
compared to alternatives. 
Dr Suzi Kerr made this point in advice 
to the select committee:
It is very costly to taxpayers and the 
economy as a whole to maintain this 
high level of protection. To raise the 
taxes to pay for it we need to distort 
economic activity (people work and 
save less when their earnings are taxed). 
In the US the cost of raising taxes is in 
the order of 40c in every dollar. It is 
probably similar in New Zealand, i.e. 
it costs the economy around $1.40 for 
every dollar worth of free allocation 
given to specific sectors.
Free allocation should certainly be 
removed as our competitors enter 
the agreement. It should be phased 
out relatively quickly even if they do 
not. This is for the same reasons that 
we do not subsidise our agriculture 
even though the US and EU do. The 
benefits to the protected activities 
are vastly outweighed by the costs to 
the economy as a whole. The phase 
out of free allocation in the existing 
bill was probably already too slow on 
economic grounds. (Kerr, 2009)
Without detailed cost-benefit analysis 
it is not clear what level of support is 
optimal, and whether these units would 
provide a better return elsewhere. It seems 
irresponsible to commit up to $3 billion 
per annum of taxpayer funds without 
more careful consideration.  
Agricultural interests have argued 
that there are few emissions reduction 
opportunities in the sector, so pricing 
will simply lead to cuts in production. 
However, New Zealand’s experience 
in removing agricultural subsidies in 
the 1980s should be remembered. This 
change, while painful for many at the time, 
brought significant benefits in the long 
run and demonstrated the tremendous 
innovative and adaptive capacity present 
in the sector. It would be wrong to assume 
Example: Holcim’s investment in a new cement plant
Holcim is considering replacing its current cement plant, increasing production 
and reducing emissions intensity. If the new plant is not built, incremental demand 
would be met with imports. At a carbon price of $50 per tonne, free allocation is 
roughly as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Potential value of free allocation to Holcim
Existing plant + imports New plant
Production 500,000 tonnes at 0.93tCO2/t 880,000 tonnes at 0.75 tCO2/t
Imports
380,000 tonnes at 0.87 
tCO2/t
Holcim emissions 465,000 tonnes p.a. 660,000 tonnes p.a.
Global emissions 797,000 tonnes p.a. 660,000 tonnes p.a.
Emissions cost to 
firm and taxpayer, 
2008 legislation
Firm $2.32 million p.a.
Taxpayer $20.9 million p.a.
Firm $12.07 million p.a.
Taxpayer $20.9 million p.a.
Emissions cost to 
firm and taxpayer,  
2009 legislation9
Firm: $5.0 million p.a.
Taxpayer $18.2 million p.a.
Firm: $0.9 million p.a.10
Taxpayer: $32.1 million p.a.
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that protecting the status quo is the best 
and only option.
Discussion
As outlined above, free allocation on a 
production basis tends to drive investment 
toward subsidised sectors, potentially 
locking in high-emissions activities. One 
way to ameliorate this is for allocation to 
be clearly transitional. Investors must be 
made aware that over the lifetime of their 
plant, the expectation is that they, and 
their competitors, will face the full price 
of emissions. In this regard, free allocation 
can be thought of as bridging support 
for industries that are competitive now 
and will be competitive under global 
emissions pricing, but may suffer during 
the transition. In the New Zealand ETS, 
this signalling could be achieved by 
capping the pool of units available for free 
allocation, with this pool declining at least 
in line with overall target levels.
Another key issue is setting appropriate 
baselines, particularly in a small economy 
like New Zealand’s where sectoral 
emissions may be far from the global 
average, and where there is often only 
one firm of any consequence per sector. 
The current legislation potentially creates 
significant windfalls to firms, and gives 
only weak signals for change. Moving to 
best-practice benchmarking (as done in 
the European ETS) would ensure that firms 
face a continual incentive to improve.
Then there are the issues raised 
by linking so closely to the yet-to-be-
established Australian scheme, as discussed 
by Wilson (2009). The structure of the 
two economies is very different. Support 
that is cost effective in the Australian 
economy may not be in New Zealand’s. 
Rigid coupling to the Australian scheme 
could therefore lead to further distortion 
of New Zealand investment decisions, at 
a cost to the economy as a whole. If an 
Australian scheme is implemented, the 
decision to directly import eligibility and 
baseline regulations into the New Zealand 
ETS effectively cedes sovereignty over 
these issues.
The most important concern with free 
allocation is, however, not so much with 
the nature of allocation (grandparented 
or production-based), but rather the level 
of allocation, particularly over the long 
term. The current New Zealand scheme 
seems highly likely to over-compensate 
firms. Detailed cost-benefit analysis is 
needed to find both the optimal level of 
free allocation, and the optimal way of 
recycling ETS revenue more generally.
Finally, allocation decisions have 
clearly not been subject to proper 
analysis and scrutiny. Compare this 
with the government’s annual budget 
process. If, for example, a new energy 
efficiency programme is proposed, it 
must demonstrate a very high benefit-
cost ratio to proceed. Spending 
decisions are balanced against all other 
government priorities – education, health, 
superannuation and so on – and against 
overall taxation and debt levels. If free 
allocation in the ETS were subject to the 
same scrutiny, this would soon flush out 
whether it is in fact a good investment. 
Would, for example, corporate tax cuts 
provide a better return than subsidising 
existing emissions intensive sectors?
Conclusion
The free allocation provided by the 2009 
legislation leaves only weak incentives for 
subsidised industries to change and is likely 
to over-compensate them for the impact 
of emissions pricing; hence, it is likely to 
be expensive for the wider economy while 
generating few environmental gains.
The problem is not the production-
based allocation per se; rather, it is that the 
total level of allocation is high, uncapped 
and only phasing out very slowly (or for 
industry, not at all). Unlike in overseas 
schemes, there are no units set aside to fund 
transitional assistance or programmes for 
the residential, small business, electricity 
generation or transport sectors, or to fund 
tax and debt reductions. If the legislation’s 
free allocations were subject to the same 
budget scrutiny as other government 
spending, they may well not pass the test 
of being wise use of taxpayers’ funds.
The slow phase-out also fails to send 
the signal to investors that there will need 
to be a transition to full market pricing in 
the medium term. 
One way to address these concerns 
would be to cap the pool of units available 
for free allocation, with this pool reducing 
over time to ensure support is phased 
out much more quickly. Within the 
cap, allocation on a production basis 
could continue, retaining the positive 
characteristics of an intensity-based 
approach.
The government has argued that any 
long-term analysis shouldn’t be taken 
seriously, because there will be reviews 
of the legislation. But leaving it to future 
governments to amend the scheme 
on an ad-hoc basis creates enormous 
uncertainty for long-term investors (IEA, 
2007). It would be better to put in place a 
framework now that sets a more realistic 
pathway for allocations into the future, so 
that major amendments are less likely. An 
allocation methodology with bipartisan 
political support is needed, underpinned 
by strong cost-benefit analysis and a clear 
view on where global emissions pricing is 
headed. 
The first scheduled review of the 
scheme is in 2011. As the ETS will only be 
coming into operation at this time, there 
will be a temptation for this review to be 
cursory. Instead, the review provides an 
opportunity for the proper cost-benefit 
analyses to be undertaken to inform 
decisions on how ETS revenues should 
be best allocated for the benefit of New 
Zealand as a whole. 
Unlike in overseas schemes, there are no units 
set aside to fund transitional assistance or 
programmes for the residential, small business, 
electricity generation or transport sectors, or to 
fund tax and debt reductions.
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1  Providing a subsidy for a number of years allows assets to 
depreciate, so can be seen as equivalent to a compensation 
payment (Kerr, 2009).
2  This assumes compensation to all affected market 
participants, not just trade-exposed energy-intensive 
industries. 
3  The phase-out rate is set by regulation, so can be reset 
without passing new legislation.
4  All curves include a small allocation to 2018 to partially 
cover deforestation of pre-1990 forests.
5  Under the Kyoto Protocol the New Zealand government 
receives a free allocation of units corresponding to its target 
level. If this regime persists, the 50% and 80% curves 
represent these free units received by the government. 
6  The dashed line data set ends in 2030 but is tracking 
linearly at that time, so has been extrapolated linearly to 
2050. 
7  The dashed line data set assumes agricultural production 
grows at around 0.7% p.a. and industrial production at 
1.5% p.a. The solid line data set has agricultural production 
increasing at 0.7% p.a. until 2020, with zero change 
thereafter, and industrial production rising at around 1.3% 
p.a. to 2030 and 1% p.a. thereafter.
8  The minister called Treasury’s analysis to 2050 ‘fantasyland’ 
(Smith, 2009b).
9 Assumes New Zealand industry average emissions of 
0.81tCO2/t, estimated from production levels at Holcim and 
Golden Bay Cement
10  This cost is low because the new plant benefits from a 
high allocative baseline, set in part by the old, inefficient 
plant. The baseline can be reset under the legislation, but 
governments will be likely to be reluctant to do so because it 
would reduce the incentive for firms to upgrade.
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